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Abstract
The international macroeconomic policy trilemma suggests that de-
spite the appeal of exchange rate stability, financial account openness
and monetary sovereignty, these cannot be achieved simultaneously. Us-
ing elements of Euclidean geometry, this paper proposes a new method
for testing the trilemma and finds considerable evidence in support of
it. Further tests indicate that, on average, policy configurations are
not on the trilemma constraint, i.e. there is a degree of ‘trilemma-
ineffectiveness’, which is costly for real output growth and price infla-
tion. It is shown that these costs can be attributed to limited exchange
rate stability and financial account openness.
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1 Introduction
There are several reasons why each aspect of the international macroeconomic
trilemma—exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary
sovereignty—may appeal to policymakers. Exchange rate stability prevents
unnecessary resource shifts into and out of trade-oriented sectors that may re-
sult from exchange rate overshooting; it may be desirable as a nominal anchor
for inflationary expectations; and, it protects a dollarised banking system from
balance sheet shocks.1 Financial openness should lead to an increase of invest-
ment inflows, which boosts output in the short-run.2 It may also generate
long-run benefits through a more efficient allocation of capital and by increas-
ing the costs of policy mistakes and lack of reforms.3 Monetary sovereignty
allows for a more effective policy toolbox both for achieving internal balance
and for responding to external shocks.
But, despite the attractiveness of each aspect of the trilemma, a policy-
maker cannot achieve all three simultaneously. For example, operating an
open financial account and achieving perfect exchange rate stability necessar-
ily implies the loss of monetary sovereignty. Any effort to change the monetary
base (or, correspondingly, the interest rate) will lead to offsetting actions by
the central bank in order to maintain the current level of the exchange rate. In
the case of an expansion accompanied by a lower interest rate, the reduction
in capital inflows will tend to weaken the domestic currency. In order to pre-
vent the exchange rate (expressed here as the price of the foreign currency in
local currency units) from appreciating, the central bank will have to absorb
1See Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
2See Bussie`re and Fratzscher (2008).
3The seminal contribution of Kose et al. (2009) explores all aspects of financial globali-
sation and concludes that it can have a “catalytic role” for total factor productivity (TFP)
growth and welfare in developing countries.
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the extra liquidity it has generated by running down its international reserves.
So, in order to maintain a degree of monetary sovereignty, the country needs
to implement restrictions in its financial account or sacrifice—to the required
extent—the exchange rate stability objective.4
This logic presumes that there are limits to the extent that the monetary
authority can sterilise the foreign exchange market intervention by injecting
liquidity in the banks’ balance sheets. Sustaining a monetary expansion under
fixed exchange rates with an open financial account would require a prolonged
reserve haemorrhage, something which the policymaker cannot accept for too
long.5 Irrespective of the hoard, international reserves are an exhaustible re-
source and such policies cannot persist indefinitely. Ultimately, the trilemma
should be a binding constraint.
In spite of the importance of the trilemma’s implications for conducting
macroeconomic policy, systematic efforts in assessing its empirical validity us-
ing large datasets are relatively recent.6 This paper contributes to the related
literature by offering a new way of testing the trilemma using elements of
Euclidean geometry. The procedure is described, and, using data from the
post-Bretton Woods era, implemented in section 2. In addition, the paper
explores the macroeconomic consequences of failing to implement policies that
maximise the extent to which the three aspects of the trilemma are met. This
is done in section 4, following the introduction of the term ‘trilemma effective-
ness’ in section 3. Section 5 concludes.
4See Aizenman (2013) for more examples on the constraint the trilemma places on
policymakers.
5Quantitatively, the relationship between the change in the domestic component of the
monetary base and the corresponding change in international reserves is captured by the
offset coefficient. An early discussion of sterilisation and the offset coefficient can be found
in Herring and Marston (1977).
6See, e.g., Shambaugh (2004), Obstfeld et al. (2005), Bleaney et al. (2013) and Aizenman
et al. (2013).
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2 The Trilemma Constraint
Previous studies have investigated the trilemma constraint by gauging the
responsiveness of the domestic interest rate to the foreign one (the latter is the
interest rate of an appropriately selected ‘base’ country). The interest rate of
a country implementing a fixed exchange rate regime with an open financial
account will converge to—and fluctuate in tandem with—the foreign interest
rate. If this is not the case, then there will be arbitrage opportunities. For
example, a too-high domestic interest rate vis-a`-vis the foreign interest rate will
see an inflow of foreign capital exploiting the differential. This inflow, given
perfect capital mobility, will result in higher asset prices and lower yields. The
arbitrage activity will continue until the interest rate differential between the
domestic and foreign assets, which are assumed to be perfect substitutes, is
zero.7
In other words, under these arrangements, a country is not expected to
possess a meaningful degree of control over its monetary policy. Shambaugh
(2004) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) find evidence that broadly support this ex-
pectation. Bleaney et al. (2013) find that pegs without capital controls are
linked to a higher degree of monetary sovereignty than the constraints of the
trilemma would suggest. Nevertheless, when they account for peg credibility
issues, their results become more consistent with the trilemma.8
A different approach, more closely related to the one pursued in this paper,
is implemented by Aizenman et al. (2013). Instead of concentrating on interest
rate correlations, they include measures of exchange rate stability, financial
7In reality, however, transaction costs may allow a financially open, exchange rate-fixing
country some degree of monetary sovereignty. This is a point made by Obstfeld et al. (2005).
8Their argument is that in low-credibility pegs, devaluation expectations feed into the
domestic interest rate disentangling it to some extent from the base country’s rate and
generating a false perception of relative monetary independence.
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account openness and monetary sovereignty in a regression framework. Their
three goals are to determine whether the relationship among the three trilemma
variables is a linear one, to obtain estimates of the tradeoffs between them and
to test the trilemma itself. They find that the trilemma has been binding
for industrialised countries since the early 1990s and for developing countries
since the mid 2000s. Most important for the aims of this paper, their results
suggest that the relationship between the trilemma variables is likely to be a
linear one.
The presumption of linearity allows the depiction of the trilemma constraint
as a triangle in the space defined by the three aspects of the trilemma. This is
shown in Figure 1 as triangle ABC. At each point in time, the combination of
exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary sovereignty
determines each country’s location in this three-dimensional space. In the
context of this paper, each point represents a macroeconomic policy outcome
(or configuration). If the trilemma is binding, then the mean distance between
the constraint and policy configurations exceeding the constraint, i.e. points
that lie off the trilemma triangle in the opposite direction of the origin, will
be statistically insignificant. This is the essence of the test proposed and
implemented in this paper.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The trilemma constraint is given by
s + m + f − 2 = 0, (1)
where s stands for exchange rate stability (the abscissa in Figure 1), m stands
for monetary sovereignty (the ordinate) and f stands for financial account
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openness (the height), and 0 ≤ s,m, f ≤ 1. Geometrically, the distance be-
tween a point and a plane is found by projecting a vector that connects the
point of interest with a point on the plane onto the unit normal vector (i.e.
a vector of length one, which is perpendicular to the plane). The length of
a vector v connecting, e.g., a point P (s1,m1, f1), which is off the plane, and,
e.g., a point Q(s,m, f), which lies on the plane, is
v =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
s1 − s
m1 −m
f1 − f
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (2)
Given (1), the unit normal vector u is9
u =
(1, 1, 1)√
3
. (3)
The projection is just |v · u|. Hence, the distance, k, is
k =
|(s1 − s) + (m1 −m) + (f1 − f)|√
3
. (4)
Substituting the trilemma constraint in (4) yields
k =
|s1 + m1 + f1 − 2|√
3
. (5)
Dropping the absolute value gives the ‘signed’ trilemma distance (henceforth,
trilemma distance): a negative value means that the point in question lies
somewhere between the origin and the trilemma plane, whereas a positive
value means that the point lies off the plane in the opposite direction of the
9More generally, it is a,b,c√
a2+b2+c2
for a plane described by an equation ax+ by + cz = d.
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origin.10
In order to calculate the distance between a configuration and the trilemma
triangle, I use an updated version of the dataset from Aizenman et al. (2010).
This features annual data on exchange rate stability, financial account openness
and monetary sovereignty. The measure of the degree of exchange rate stability,
s, is constructed using monthly observations of the exchange rate, e, vis-a´-vis
a base currency (most frequently but not always the US dollar). For country
j in a given year, it is
sj = 0.01×
0.01 +
√√√√√ nj∑
t=1
(
∆log (ejt)−∆log (ej)
)2
nj − 1

−1
with nj being the number of available monthly observations for country j
in that year. The measure of the degree of monetary independence, m, is
constructed using monthly observations of money market interest rates. For
country j in a given year, it is
mj = 0.5×
1− ∑njt=1 (ijt − ij) (ikt − ik)√∑nj
t=1
(
ijt − ij
)2∑nj
t=1
(
ikt − ik
)2

with ij being the interest rate of ‘home’ country j and ik being the interest
rate of the ‘base’ country k.11 The IMF’s Annual Report of Exchange Ar-
rangements and Exchange Restrictions is used to construct a de jure measure
of capital account openness. This is calculated as the first principal compo-
nent of variables representing controls on the current and capital accounts, the
10There is, of course, no concept of negative distance: the sign solely identifies the direc-
tion.
11Aizenman et al. (2010) make certain adjustments to these measures in order to deal
with the tendency of s to overstate flexibility and of m to be ‘noisy’. For more information
see the notes on their paper available at http://web.pdx.edu/∼ito/trilemma indexes.htm.
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presence of multiple exchange rates and the treatment of export proceeds.12
Similarly to s and m, it is normalised to take values between zero and one.
The dataset consists of 5,289 usable observations—i.e. years between the
period 1970 and 2012 for which the distance from the plane can be calculated.
Table 1 reports overwhelming evidence that policy configurations are, on av-
erage, consistent with there being a binding trilemma constraint. This is true
across income groups (panel A in Table 1), geographic regions (panel B) and
time (panel C), as evidenced by the negative average values for the trilemma
distance variable.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
A more formal test of the trilemma involves testing the null hypothesis
that the mean of the trilemma distance is zero against the alternative that
it is positive. Inability to reject the null is interpreted as evidence that the
constraint is binding, i.e. that the mean of the positive values observed are
insignificant.13
A natural candidate for this assessment is a Student’s t-test. The latter
is based on the classical assumptions about the distribution of observations,
including the assumption of normality. Statistically, this is rejected for the
trilemma distance variable.14 However, the extent of similarity between the
normal density and the variable’s kernel density—both plotted along with a
histogram in Figure 2—is conducive to using the t-test. Results are reported in
12For more details see Chinn and Ito (2006).
13Why these exist in the first place is an important question, but not one that is pursued
here. One explanation could be that the degree of monetary sovereignty is actually exag-
gerated as it may reflect credibility issues rather than actual monetary independence. See
Bleaney et al. (2013) for details.
14Skewness is equal to 0.12 and the hypothesis that the difference with the degree of
skewness of a normal distribution is zero cannot be rejected. Hence, on this criterion,
normality cannot be rejected. However, one should reject the same hypothesis about kurtosis
(equal to 2.5).
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the last column of Table 1 for the entire sample, income groups, geographical
regions and decades in the sample. In all cases, the null cannot be rejected.15
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3 Introducing Trilemma Effectiveness
The numbers reported in Table 1 show that, on average, trilemma distance is
negative. In this paper, this situation is defined as ‘trilemma ineffectiveness’.
In contrast, an observation corresponds to a trilemma-effective configuration
if the mean lies on the trilemma plane, i.e. if k = 0, or exceeds it. Statistical
tests (not reported here but available from the author upon request) reject
the hypothesis that the average trilemma distance is zero, in favour of the
alternative that it is negative. The aim of this section is to probe the extent
of trilemma ineffectiveness.16
The numbers reported in Panel A of Table 1 show that low-income coun-
tries are, collectively, the most trilemma-ineffective. In other words, these
countries could enjoy the benefits of a greater degree of financial account open-
ness, exchange rate stability or monetary independence—or a combination of
these—by implementing the relevant policies. Middle-income countries are
more trilemma-effective, even though they are some way off the, historically,
better performing high-income group.
15Table A1 in the Appendix reports results for individual countries. Again, the null
cannot be rejected in the majority of cases.
16Explaining why observed policies are not closer to the trilemma constraint, i.e. identi-
fying the reasons behind trilemma ineffectiveness, would be a natural extension of this work.
One possible line of research would be to consider whether varying trilemma distances reflect
varying levels of capital mobility. The latter may not necessarily coincide with the extent
of financial openness because of, e.g., changes in investors’ degree of risk-aversion. That
could lead to a reduction of cross-country asset substitutability and, consequently, of capital
mobility. This argument is offered by Globan (2014) who uses trilemma deviations as a
measure of capital mobility for 11 European post-transition economies.
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But what are the precise policy profiles of the three income groups? The
top graphic in Figure 3 clarifies this. High-income countries are the most finan-
cially open while enjoying a similar degree of exchange rate stability with the
other groups. Naturally, they have the least independent monetary policies,
even though not to an extent that would jeopardise their relative trilemma
effectiveness. In contrast, low-income countries, have a low degree of finan-
cial account openness and, at the same time, the lowest degree of exchange
rate stability. This, consequently, affords them a more independent mone-
tary policy compared to the other income groups, especially the high-income
group. Still, the average degree of monetary sovereignty is far from perfect,
and, consequently, their monetary policies are not truly shielded from the
world’s monetary conditions.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
A breakdown of average trilemma effectiveness by geographical region for
low and middle-income countries reveals that economies in the Latin America
and Caribbean region have implemented trilemma policies that are as effective
as those of high-income countries. This region, as a whole, is also substantially
more financially open than the rest, even though it is not as open as high-
income countries. Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa
and East Asia and the Pacific are at the other end of the spectrum, where
large improvements in trilemma effectiveness could be made. Middle East and
North Africa’s average policy configuration is closer to the trilemma constraint.
Overall, the economies in our sample took big steps towards trilemma effec-
tiveness in the 1990s and 2000s. This period corresponds to the opening up of
financial accounts, as can be seen in the bottom graphic of Figure 3.
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4 Trilemma Effectiveness and Macroeconomic
Performance
4.1 Initial considerations
Having established that international macroeconomic policy is broadly bound
by the trilemma, it is natural to ask whether trilemma effectiveness is linked
to macroeconomic performance. Two aspects of the latter are examined, real
economic growth and price inflation outcomes. The a priori expectation re-
garding growth is that economies achieving a greater degree of exchange rate
stability, financial openness and monetary autonomy should grow faster—even
though there are some qualifications to this assertion. Calvo and Reinhart
(2002) report a “widespread” aversion to large currency swings, especially
among emerging economies. They offer a range of possible explanations for
this aversion, including the existence of output costs associated with exchange
rate fluctuations. Aghion et al. (2009) find that real exchange rate volatility
can indeed have a significant impact on productivity growth, especially in less
financially developed economies.
The role of financial integration has been explored in a number of studies,
many of which have established a positive correlation with economic growth.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kose et al. (2009) conclude that the effects
on TFP growth can be catalytic for developing countries. Using data for
the period 1976-1995, Klein and Olivei (2008) find that countries with more
open capital accounts grow faster, even though this result is driven by the
developed countries in their sample. But, of course, an open financial account
does not guarantee a smooth inflow of investment from abroad. Calvo (1998)
shows how capital may suddenly stop flowing into the domestic economy with
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deleterious effects. And, more recently, Rey (2013) has argued that the extent
of financial integration in recent times has led to a ‘global financial cycle’. As
this tends to be unrelated to individual economies’ macroeconomic conditions,
it generates credit booms and busts. The implication is that irrespective of
the exchange rate regime, an open capital account is equivalent to a loss of
monetary independence. And this can lead to crises, if, for example, the global
financial cycle leads to an ‘extreme’ credit expansion.
The link between trilemma effectiveness and inflation is more difficult to
infer from the theory because in the small open economy framework of Mundell-
Fleming prices are sticky. Real world considerations, however, give rise to an
expectation that, on balance, the two should move in opposite directions. The
first consideration is exchange rate stability. In the long run, if purchasing
power parity holds, a stable exchange rate can be seen as an indication of a
credible anti-inflation monetary stance. Hence, it should be linked to lower in-
flation rates.17 The second consideration is financial integration. The potential
link between an open financial account and prices is a priori quite uncertain.
If unemployment is low and the financial account leads to a higher inflow of
direct investment, there could be upward pressure on wages and prices. Or,
in different circumstances, the additional domestic production due to capital
inflows could put downward pressure on product prices. Increased inward in-
vestment may also increase the value of the domestic currency making imports
cheaper, and, hence, help reduce inflation. Available empirical evidence are
consistent with the argument that financial integration should be linked to
lower inflation rates, e.g. Wei and Tytell (2004). Finally, monetary indepen-
17Note that exchange rate stability is not necessarily a feature associated only with ex-
change rate pegs. It could be the case that the currency is stable within a flexible exchange
rate framework. It is also possible that instability is associated with a fixed exchange rate
regime if the latter is readjusted frequently or abandoned altogether.
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dence can cut both ways. It should be good news for inflation outcomes if the
monetary authorities have established their anti-inflation credentials. Equally,
it should be bad news if the monetary authorities lack such credibility. Ulti-
mately, the precise relationship between trilemma effectiveness and inflation is
an empirical question, which is what this paper tries to answer next.
This very brief discussion has touched upon the issues surrounding inter-
national macroeconomic policy, the latter being defined as the combination
of exchange rate stability, financial account openness and monetary indepen-
dence. Depending on preferences, a policymaker may want to pursue one par-
ticular policy at the expense of another, but, overall, and in the long-run, they
will want to adopt a configuration that places the economy on the trilemma
constraint. For example, if a policymaker values exchange rate stability but
would like to manage the financial account, then she would expect to get at
least some degree of monetary sovereignty.
4.2 Data and methodology
The degree of trilemma effectiveness is captured by the trilemma distance
variable.18 Recall that it is a ‘signed’ distance in that a negative value shows
that the trilemma constraint has not been violated and a positive sign shows
that it has.19 Values corresponding to points closer to the constraint, on it,
or exceeding it are preferred to points that lie away from the constraint and
towards the origin, as they correspond to more favourable combinations of the
three aspects of the trilemma.
The functional forms of the estimated growth and inflation equations are
18The configuration is observed but is not ‘actual’ due to the de jure nature of financial
account openness. This point is discussed further in the conclusions.
19The analysis in the previous section has shown that, collectively, the hypothesis of a
positive mean trilemma distance is rejected.
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similar to Husain et al. (2005), augmented with the trilemma effectiveness
measure. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2. The
dependent variable in the growth equation is the natural log change per an-
num of GDP per capita in 2005 international dollars (using PPP rates).20 In
explaining growth, factor accumulation is captured via the inclusion of invest-
ment (gross fixed capital formation divided by GDP) and population—both in
level (natural log) and as a growth rate (change in natural log).21 The govern-
ment sector is captured by the budget balance (as a share of GDP) and tax
revenue (again as a share of GDP). In addition, imports plus exports (percent
of GDP) and terms of trade (change in the natural log of net barter terms of
trade) are also included.22
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The inflation equation features M2 growth, real output growth (as defined
above), imports plus exports as a share of GDP, terms of trade growth, the
budget balance as a share of GDP and the central bank governor’s time in
office.23
The econometric specifications feature country fixed effects or country and
time fixed effects (year dummies). Inclusion of country effects controls for
individual country characteristics that are not captured by the explanatory
variables (e.g. the quality of institutions). The year dummies capture exter-
20The source for all variables is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, unless
otherwise stated.
21Data for the mean years of schooling for over-25s (source: UNESCO) were collected in
order to capture the effect of human capital on economic growth. However, the number of
observations is too small to include this variable in the specification.
22To capture output convergence, each country’s real output per capita was divided by
US’s real output per capita in 1980 (the first year for which US data are available for this
variable). It turns out that the estimated coefficient of this variable is insignificant in all
estimations and does not affect the estimates of trilemma distance. Hence, it is not included
in the model.
23Data for the latter are from Dreher et al. (2010).
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nal shocks that affect all countries (e.g. a US monetary policy shock). The
resulting specification, where both country and time dummies are included,
captures the relationship between trilemma effectiveness and macroeconomic
performance within countries.
The decision to model effects as fixed rather than treat them as random
was based on the results from a test by Schaffer and Stillman (2006). This
test is appropriate for use in panel data estimations where standard errors
are cluster-robust, i.e. errors that are robust to cross-sectional heteroscedas-
ticity and within-panel serial correlation.24,25 The Wald test statistic leads
to the rejection of random effects in both the estimated inflation and growth
equations.
Finally, a lag of the dependent variable is introduced in the list of explana-
tory variables in order to control for persistence effects. Strict exogeneity is
assumed, i.e. a shock in the error term is not supposed to exert influence on
current or future values of any of the independent variables. Clearly, this is
a restrictive assumption, but one that is relaxed in robustness checks. The
two-step system estimator of Blundell and Bond (2000) is used with correction
for hetroscedasticity in the errors.
A question arises as to how to treat the positive values of the distance vari-
able k, as they could, potentially, represent measurement bias. One possibility
is that a de jure open financial account may not coincide with de facto perfect
capital mobility if domestic and foreign investment assets are imperfect substi-
tutes. In such cases, the degree of capital mobility will be overstated and the
monetary authorities may have greater monetary leeway than predicted by the
trilemma. Positive values of k would then result from incorrectly measuring
24The commonly used Hausman test is not suitable in this case. The two tests are
asymptotically equivalent under conditional homoscedasticity.
25For more details on cluster-robust errors see Nichols and Schaffer (2007).
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the elasticity of international capital flows with respect to changes in domestic
interest rates.
A different measurement bias, however, pushes in the opposite direction.
The measure of monetary independence used here may be understating the
true extent of the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy. A
high correlation between country interest rates may be indicative of a common
shock rather than monetary dependence per se.26 With exchange rate stability
captured reasonably accurately, attributing k’s positive values to a measure-
ment bias presupposes that the effect of overstating capital mobility exceeds
that of understating monetary independence.
An alternative explanation could be that, in the short run, the trilemma
constraint is not binding for countries with a sufficient stock of international
reserves.27 For example, a monetary expansion under perfect capital mobility
and fixed exchange rates may be effective if the central bank increases its
holding of net domestic assets at the expense of net foreign assets, which results
from sterilising the foreign exchange market intervention that is necessary to
stabilise the exchange rate. Even in the absence of a measurement bias, this
would correspond to positive values of k.
The two explanations have different ramifications for the distance variable.
If the positive values are down to a measurement bias, then they need to be
replaced by zeros. In contrast, there is no such requirement if one accepts the
international reserves explanation to be true. In practice, however, whether
variable k is truncated or not makes little difference and the results are almost
identical. The results reported here feature the non-truncated data.
26See Popper et al. (2013) for a criticism of the interest rate correlation approach to
measuring monetary independence.
27See Steiner (2013) for an empirical assessment of the extent to which international
reserves are built up as a substitute for capital controls.
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4.3 Main Results
Table 3 reports results for the growth equation. The baseline model, where
trilemma effectiveness is the only explanatory variable of growth, shows that
the link between the two variables is statistically significant. This result does
not depend on whether year dummies are added to the specification. It also
survives almost intact the inclusion of variables from Husain et al. (2005) in
the augmented specification. In the latter, investment, population growth
and the budget balance are statistically significant and with the expected sign
under both effects formulations (country-only and time and country effects).
The dynamic specification results confirm the importance of trilemma-effective
policies.28
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 reports results for the inflation equation. The estimates of trilemma
effectiveness in the baseline equations are, as expected, negative and statisti-
cally significant. Even as part of a richer specification (the augmented models)
this remains the case and, along with money growth and real output growth,
trilemma effectiveness is a significant determinant of inflation in the sample.
The dynamic specification results are slightly more ambiguous, as the inclusion
of year dummies removes the significance from the trilemma effectiveness co-
efficient. But, the overall picture that emerges from these models is difficult to
blur: trilemma ineffectiveness goes hand-in-hand with higher inflation rates.29
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
28The estimations were repeated sequentially treating investment as a predetermined or
endogenous variable. The thrust of the results remained unaffected.
29Allowing money growth to be predetermined or endogenous does not change the results
materially.
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4.4 Additional Results: Breaking down the trilemma
These results warrant further exploration. If trilemma ineffectiveness is asso-
ciated with macroeconomic costs, is it possible to identify the precise aspect
of the trilemma that underlies this link? In order to answer this question,
the relative importance of the distance between policy configurations and the
trilemma triangle’s vertices (A, B and C in Figure 1) needs to be quantified.
More specifically, each vertex corresponds to a combination of the maximum
possible value for two of the trilemma policy objectives and zero for the other.
Point A depicts a financially open economy with stable exchange rates (“Stable,
Open”); point B depicts a financially open economy with monetary sovereignty
(“Open, Sovereign”); and, point C depicts a financially closed economy with
monetary sovereignty (“Stable, Sovereign”). The distance from each vertex is
calculated using the Euclidean norm:
dit,x =
√
(sit − s˜)2 + (mit − m˜)2 + (fit − f˜)2,
where x = (A,B,C) and
(
s˜, m˜, f˜
)
is (1, 0, 1) for vertex A, (0, 1, 1) for vertex
B, and (1, 1, 0) for vertex C; subscript it indexes a country i and year t ob-
servation; s, m and f stand for exchange rate stability, monetary sovereignty
and financial account openness, as before.
The results under Specification I column of Table 5 are from the growth
and inflation models where trilemma effectiveness has been replaced by the dis-
tances from the stable and open, open and sovereign, and stable and sovereign
configurations. For the growth equation, the greater the distance from points
A (stable and open) and C (stable and sovereign), the lower the real growth
rate. The distance from point B (open and sovereign) is not significant. Since
the common element of points A and C is exchange rate stability, it is likely
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that this aspect of trilemma policies is associated with higher economic growth.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
For the inflation equation, the distances from A (stable and open) and B
(open and sovereign) are significant, whereas the distance from C (stable and
sovereign) is not. The common element of points A and B is financial account
openness, so it is likely that this aspect of trilemma policies is commensurate
with a lower inflation rate. This result provides support for the argument
that increased financial account openness generates these conditions that are
necessary for inflation to be reigned in.
Other estimations, results of which are not shown because of space limi-
tations, tell a similar story. With regard to the growth equation, the signs
and statistical significance of the coefficients of the three distance variables
do not change in the static model with country and time effects or the dy-
namic model with country effects. In contrast, introducing time effects in a
dynamic specification, which is then estimated with the two-step Blundell and
Bond procedure, renders all coefficients other than investment insignificant.
With regard to the inflation equation, the coefficient of Distance from Stable
& Open remains positive and statistically significant in all models other than
the dynamic specification with fixed country and time effects—in the latter
only the one-period lagged inflation and money growth variables have statisti-
cally significant coefficients. The results concerning the coefficient of Distance
from Open & Sovereign are less robust to alternative specifications. Finally,
for the inflation equation, the coefficient of Distance from Stable & Sovereign
is insignificant everywhere.30
30Relaxing strict exogeneity by endogenising investment and money growth in the output
growth and inflation equations, respectively, leaves results largely unaltered.
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The significance of exchange rate stability and financial account openness is
further explored by employing deviations from their ‘average’ values. Average
values here are taken to represent what Popper et al. (2013) label as ‘middle-
type’ policy configurations, i.e. configurations where each of the variables
has a value of 2/3 and the trilemma constraint is satisfied.31 Results are
presented under Specification II in Table 5 and confirm the earlier findings.
The link between ‘above average’ exchange rate stability and economic growth
is confirmed. In addition, exchange rate stability is also linked to inflation, even
though its estimated coefficient is approximately half the size of the coefficient
of financial openness.
5 Conclusions
The international macroeconomic policy trilemma is now more than half a
century old (Mundell, 1963). It has profound implications for open macroe-
conomic policy, as it sets out clear constraints within which the latter has to
operate. Under perfect capital mobility, and assuming asset substitutability,
the prevalence of the trilemma is guaranteed by the no-arbitrage condition.
But if markets are imperfect, there is scope to examine whether countries’
policies are really bound by it.
There have been few such tests in the literature and most of these have
appeared in the last decade. This paper proposes a new method for testing
the trilemma based on Euclidean geometry. The appeal of this approach is that
it is straightforward to implement and easy to visualise. Using annual data
between 1970 and 2012 on exchange rate stability, financial account openness
and monetary independence for 123 countries, the tests support the policy
31So, exchange rate stability is calculated as s−2/3√
3
, and so on.
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relevance of the trilemma constraint.
But what happens in terms of macroeconomic outcomes when countries’
policies deviate from it? Tests indicate that, on average, policy configura-
tions are not on the trilemma constraint, i.e. there is a degree of ‘trilemma-
ineffectiveness’. The paper shows that this has costs in terms of real output
growth and price inflation. It also explores the role of each of the trilemma’s
dimensions and finds that exchange rate stability matters for growth and fi-
nancial account openness matters for inflation. These results are consistent
with Aghion et al. (2009) and Wei and Tytell (2004), respectively.
Following from these results, two policy recommendations could be made:
first, to open up the financial account, and, second, to manage the exchange
rate so that it does not become excessively volatile. Even though the mech-
anisms through which these arrangements would affect inflation and output
have not been empirically probed in this work, past experience suggests that
the benefits of increased foreign investment and international trade may be
relevant. Of course, such considerations are not without caveats. Namely, fi-
nancial account liberalisation needs to be “well planned, timed, and sequenced”
(International Monetary Fund, 2012) and exchange rate stability may require
the accumulation of international reserves at the expense of other, more pro-
ductive uses of capital. Even with these caveats in place, there are risks that
need to be taken into account when designing international macroeconomic
policy along these lines.
This work can be extended in several directions. First, it is important to re-
fine the measurement of the trilemma dimensions. For example, Shambaugh’s
(2004) approach may need to be modified in order to ensure that common
country shocks are not mistaken for increased monetary dependence. Popper
et al. (2013) derive an alternative measure of monetary sovereignty but this
20
presupposes the validity of the trilemma and, hence, cannot be used to test it.
Regarding financial account openness, the use of a de facto measure would be
advantageous compared to a de jure measure. Deviations from covered inter-
est parity can be used for this purpose but there are data limitations. Second,
improved measurement of the relevant variables should encourage a thorough
examination of the trilemma’s linearity. Alternative functional forms may
be explored. Finally, it would be worthy to identify the precise mechanisms
through which improving trilemma effectiveness is linked to better macroeco-
nomic outcomes.
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Table 1: Trilemma Distance
Country Mean Median Min. Max. S.D. N t-stat
Panel A: Income Groups
All −0.28 −0.27 −0.99 0.42 0.26 5289 −79.8*
LIC −0.39 −0.38 −0.96 0.33 0.23 1181 −58.3*
MIC −0.28 −0.28 −0.99 0.42 0.27 2581 −54.1*
HIC −0.21 −0.19 −0.98 0.41 0.24 1527 −33.3*
Panel B: Geographical Regions
EAP −0.37 −0.39 −0.85 0.35 0.24 473 −33.8*
ECA −0.35 −0.36 −0.98 0.29 0.23 268 −25.1*
LAC −0.21 −0.20 −0.99 0.39 0.28 940 −22.4*
MENA −0.29 −0.34 −0.85 0.42 0.30 332 −17.5*
SA −0.36 −0.39 −0.83 0.39 0.25 255 −23.4*
SSA −0.36 −0.32 −0.96 0.33 0.22 1494 −62.0*
Panel C: Decades
1970s −0.31 −0.29 −0.98 0.32 0.23 858 −39.0*
1980s −0.34 −0.32 −0.99 0.33 0.26 1175 −45.1*
1990s −0.28 −0.26 −0.98 0.42 0.27 1479 −40.2*
2000s −0.23 −0.22 −0.96 0.39 0.25 1777 −39.4*
Notes: H0 : Mean = 0, H1 : Mean > 0. A “*” indicates that H0 cannot be rejected at
the 5% level. A minus sign ‘−’ signifies direction. Definitions of income groups: LIC: low-
income countries; MIC: middle-income countries; HIC: high-income countries. Definition
of geographical regions: EAP: East Asia and the Pacific; ECA: Europe and Central Asia;
LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SA: South
Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 5: Stable, Open, Sovereign: Which Ones Matter?
Specification I Specification II
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
Economic Growth Equation
Investment (percent GDP) 0.21*** (0.07) 0.21*** (0.07)
Population (level) −2.13 (2.50) −2.10*** (2.51)
Population (growth) −1.65*** (0.50) −1.70 (0.50)
Budget (percent GDP) 0.13* (0.08) 0.15** (0.08)
Tax (percent GDP) −0.17 (0.11) −0.15 (0.11)
Trade (percent GDP) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
Terms of Trade (growth) 0.06* (0.03) 0.05*** (0.04)
Distance from Stable & Open −4.81*** (1.12)
Distance from Open & Sovereign −1.40 (1.28)
Distance from Stable & Sovereign −6.52*** (1.19)
Exchange Rate Stability Deviation 7.71*** (1.87)
Financial Openness Deviation −3.46 (2.27)
Monetary Independence Deviation 1.46 (1.81)
Constant 45.20 (40.33) 33.12 (40.47)
Inflation Equation
M2 (growth) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.31*** (0.05)
Real output (growth) −0.20*** (0.07) −0.25*** (0.06)
Trade (percent GDP) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Terms of Trade (growth) 0.03 (0.04) −0.01 (0.03)
Budget (percent GDP) 0.22** (0.10) 0.01 (0.09)
CB Governor time in office −0.20 (0.15) 0.01 (0.09)
Distance from Stable & Open 29.33** (14.65)
Distance from Open & Sovereign 23.79* (13.15)
Distance from Stable & Sovereign 11.34 (9.34)
Exchange Rate Stability Deviation −8.87*** (3.22)
Financial Openness Deviation −19.04*** (6.90)
Monetary Independence Deviation 0.28 (3.57)
Constant −52.32 (32.22) 0.01 (1.92)
Note: Least squares dummy variables estimation with country effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-panel (serial)
correlation. For information on the variables see notes of Tables 3 and 4, as well as Section
4.4.
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Figure 1: The Trilemma Constraint
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Figure 2: Histogram and Densities of Trilemma Distance
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Figure 3: Trilemma Policy Choices: by Income (top graph), by Geographical
Region (middle graph) and by Decade (bottom graph). Exchange rate stability,
monetary independence and financial account openness in parentheses.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Trilemma Distance by Country
Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Albania −0.45 −0.42 −0.71 −0.21 0.15 17 −12.3*
Algeria −0.61 −0.63 −0.74 −0.39 0.09 38 −41.1*
Angola −0.63 −0.62 −0.84 −0.18 0.21 17 −12.5*
Antigua 0.20 0.19 −0.04 0.29 0.10 25 10.2
Argentina −0.41 −0.49 −0.89 0.28 0.35 35 −6.7*
Armenia −0.10 −0.09 −0.43 0.19 0.15 16 −2.6*
Aruba −0.17 −0.20 −0.28 −0.05 0.08 18 −9.3*
Australia −0.33 −0.34 −0.66 −0.03 0.15 42 −14.2*
Austria −0.09 −0.05 −0.33 0.03 0.10 42 −5.6*
Azerbaijan −0.29 −0.32 −0.55 0 0.15 16 −8.0*
Bahamas, The −0.21 −0.25 −0.39 0.15 0.12 35 −10.7*
Bahrain 0.14 0.13 −0.01 0.37 0.09 35 8.5
Bangladesh −0.46 −0.46 −0.79 0.04 0.21 36 −13.0*
Barbados −0.21 −0.17 −0.69 0.04 0.15 38 −9.0*
Belarus −0.50 −0.55 −0.98 0.03 0.30 16 −6.7*
Belgium −0.10 −0.06 −0.47 0.08 0.12 42 −5.4*
Belize −0.15 −0.17 −0.33 0.02 0.11 27 −7.0*
Benin −0.18 −0.20 −0.33 −0.05 0.08 33 −12.7*
Bhutan −0.22 −0.20 −0.41 −0.17 0.06 25 −17.7*
Bolivia −0.07 0.04 −0.91 0.23 0.29 41 −1.4*
Botswana −0.36 −0.33 −0.72 −0.06 0.19 36 −11.5*
Brazil −0.59 −0.58 −0.98 −0.19 0.17 42 −22.9*
Bulgaria −0.22 −0.23 −0.74 0.29 0.33 18 −2.8*
Burkina Faso −0.16 −0.16 −0.33 −0.02 0.09 24 −8.57*
Burundi −0.52 −0.57 −0.82 −0.20 0.17 35 −17.91*
Cambodia −0.33 −0.29 −0.78 0.04 0.23 17 −5.9*
Cameroon −0.19 −0.21 −0.53 0.02 0.12 42 −10.2*
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Canada −0.14 −0.15 −0.35 0.07 0.09 42 −10.4*
Cape Verde −0.37 −0.47 −0.62 −0.09 0.18 27 −10.6*
Central African −0.22 −0.23 −0.53 −0.05 0.10 42 −14.0*
Chad −0.23 −0.24 −0.53 −0.05 0.10 42 −14.5*
Chile −0.44 −0.49 −0.85 −0.01 0.21 35 −12.3*
China −0.34 −0.29 −0.65 −0.12 0.15 28 −11.6*
Colombia −0.45 −0.45 −0.78 −0.18 0.15 42 −19.8*
Comoros −0.35 −0.41 −0.48 −0.20 0.12 20 −12.9*
Congo, Dem. Rep. −0.67 −0.66 −0.92 −0.39 0.14 25 −23.5*
Congo, Rep. −0.23 −0.23 −0.41 −0.05 0.10 42 −15.0*
Costa Rica −0.20 −0.11 −0.78 0.30 0.28 42 −4.6*
Coˆte d’Ivoire −0.22 −0.21 −0.50 0.01 0.11 42 −13.1*
Croatia −0.22 −0.21 −0.38 −0.13 0.06 16 −13.7*
Cyprus −0.40 −0.49 −0.65 0.01 0.21 42 −12.5*
Czech Republic −0.19 −0.19 −0.42 0 0.13 16 −5.9*
Denmark −0.16 −0.10 −0.50 0.17 0.22 42 −4.6*
Djibouti 0.21 0.19 0.04 0.42 0.13 16 6.6
Dominica −0.10 −0.05 −0.27 0.14 0.09 30 −6.4*
Dominican Republic −0.31 −0.35 −0.72 0.18 0.30 17 −4.2*
Ecuador −0.17 −0.05 −0.67 0.29 0.30 39 −3.5*
Egypt, Arab Rep. −0.21 −0.29 −0.85 0.22 0.25 42 −5.3*
El Salvador −0.00 0.12 −0.82 0.39 0.32 29 −0.1*
Equatorial Guinea −0.24 −0.26 −0.39 −0.07 0.08 27 −15.6*
Estonia 0.00 0.06 −0.38 0.18 0.17 16 0.1*
Ethiopia −0.29 −0.20 −0.72 −0.13 0.17 24 −8.5*
Fiji −0.53 −0.53 −0.78 −0.29 0.14 35 −23.4*
Finland −0.19 −0.21 −0.53 0.07 0.17 42 −7.5*
France −0.27 −0.26 −0.72 0.07 0.25 42 −7.1*
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Gabon −0.17 −0.14 −0.53 0.03 0.12 42 −9.3*
Gambia, The −0.23 −0.22 −0.63 −0.04 0.14 35 −10.0*
Georgia −0.24 −0.25 −0.56 0.03 0.16 16 −6.0*
Germany −0.19 −0.20 −0.40 0.17 0.13 42 −9.6*
Ghana −0.45 −0.43 −0.87 −0.08 0.22 42 −13.0*
Greece −0.34 −0.40 −0.79 0.04 0.26 42 −8.6*
Grenada −0.23 −0.27 −0.38 −0.05 0.08 31 −15.3*
Guatemala −0.10 −0.13 −0.61 0.32 0.22 41 −2.9*
Guinea −0.54 −0.48 −0.96 −0.12 0.20 21 −12.2*
Guinea−Bissau −0.64 −0.63 −0.85 −0.42 0.09 31 −38.8*
Guyana −0.17 −0.20 −0.81 0.28 0.27 42 −4.0*
Haiti −0.29 −0.30 −0.84 0.13 0.26 18 −4.8*
Honduras −0.16 −0.20 −0.74 0.25 0.23 33 −4.0*
Hong Kong, China 0.15 0.18 −0.24 0.37 0.13 30 6.4
Hungary −0.36 −0.33 −0.84 0.08 0.28 26 −6.6*
Iceland −0.51 −0.57 −0.98 −0.10 0.21 42 −15.8*
India −0.51 −0.53 −0.80 −0.22 0.14 42 −23.8*
Indonesia −0.16 −0.27 −0.52 0.22 0.26 29 −3.4*
Iran, Islamic Republic −0.17 −0.24 −0.43 0.21 0.20 19 −3.6*
Ireland −0.19 −0.17 −0.65 0.03 0.19 42 −6.5*
Israel −0.38 −0.42 −0.78 −0.03 0.22 30 −9.5*
Italy −0.30 −0.31 −0.95 0.19 0.31 42 −6.3*
Jamaica −0.23 −0.22 −0.96 0.19 0.27 42 −5.7*
Japan −0.20 −0.21 −0.46 −0.01 0.10 42 −12.7*
Jordan −0.18 −0.26 −0.64 0.39 0.31 42 −3.8*
Kazakhstan −0.37 −0.33 −0.69 −0.17 0.13 16 −11.9*
Kenya −0.40 −0.42 −0.74 −0.04 0.20 42 −12.5*
Korea, Rep. −0.38 −0.39 −0.79 −0.12 0.18 42 −13.8*
Continued on next page
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Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Kuwait −0.08 −0.08 −0.30 0.14 0.11 37 −4.5*
Kyrgyzstan −0.11 −0.10 −0.33 0.05 0.10 15 −4.5*
Lao PDR −0.47 −0.47 −0.85 −0.20 0.18 30 −13.9*
Latvia −0.06 −0.05 −0.32 0.13 0.12 16 −2.1*
Lebanon −0.04 −0.02 −0.35 0.38 0.21 42 −1.1*
Lesotho −0.31 −0.32 −0.47 −0.06 0.11 32 −15.6*
Liberia −0.03 −0.07 −0.46 0.33 0.19 29 −0.8*
Libya −0.42 −0.53 −0.75 −0.05 0.23 33 −10.5*
Lithuania −0.19 −0.17 −0.37 −0.06 0.08 16 −9.3*
Madagascar −0.48 −0.52 −0.76 −0.18 0.19 40 −16.2*
Malawi −0.53 −0.59 −0.87 −0.09 0.18 42 −18.7*
Malaysia −0.21 −0.16 −0.57 0.18 0.19 42 −7.2*
Maldives 0.06 0.13 −0.39 0.39 0.26 30 1.1*
Mali −0.20 −0.20 −0.43 0.01 0.11 42 −11.7*
Malta −0.46 −0.55 −0.69 0.02 0.22 40 −13.1*
Mauritania −0.50 −0.53 −0.76 −0.20 0.13 41 −23.6*
Mauritius −0.42 −0.33 −0.78 −0.07 0.22 40 −12.0*
Mexico −0.29 −0.31 −0.61 0.22 0.22 36 −7.8*
Micronesia, Fed. 0.12 0.10 −0.13 0.35 0.16 16 3.0
Moldova −0.46 −0.48 −0.57 −0.33 0.07 16 −28.3*
Mongolia −0.19 −0.18 −0.41 0 0.13 17 −6.2*
Morocco −0.50 −0.48 −0.72 −0.26 0.10 40 −31.2*
Mozambique −0.62 −0.62 −0.85 −0.35 0.17 18 −15.8*
Myanmar −0.58 −0.58 −0.71 −0.45 0.07 37 −50.4*
Namibia −0.42 −0.45 −0.58 −0.26 0.08 18 −22.9*
Nepal −0.39 −0.41 −0.83 −0.03 0.17 38 −14.4*
Netherlands −0.05 0 −0.46 0.16 0.14 36 −2.0*
New Zealand −0.32 −0.32 −0.69 −0.07 0.15 42 −13.7*
Continued on next page
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Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Nicaragua 0.09 0.19 −0.62 0.39 0.28 22 1.5*
Niger −0.22 −0.19 −0.53 0.01 0.13 42 −10.7*
Nigeria −0.45 −0.47 −0.77 −0.05 0.19 42 −15.3*
Norway −0.31 −0.29 −0.55 −0.05 0.14 42 −14.7*
Oman 0.20 0.23 0.01 0.29 0.09 32 13.0
Pakistan −0.39 −0.38 −0.71 −0.01 0.18 42 −14.0*
Panama 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.38 0.10 26 8.6
Papua New Guinea −0.42 −0.46 −0.63 −0.07 0.16 33 −15.0*
Paraguay −0.29 −0.27 −0.70 0.04 0.14 22 −9.4*
Peru −0.32 −0.22 −0.99 0.08 0.31 42 −6.7*
Philippines −0.42 −0.42 −0.85 −0.12 0.18 42 −15.5*
Poland −0.64 −0.68 −0.86 −0.37 0.14 21 −21.0*
Portugal −0.28 −0.33 −0.64 0.19 0.25 42 −7.2*
Qatar 0.21 0.23 0.01 0.35 0.10 31 11.3
Romania −0.32 −0.34 −0.72 −0.02 0.23 18 −5.9*
Russian Federation −0.35 −0.36 −0.64 −0.16 0.13 16 −10.3*
Rwanda −0.47 −0.49 −0.75 −0.11 0.16 42 −19.0*
Samoa −0.61 −0.60 −0.81 −0.35 0.12 29 −26.1*
Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe −0.50 −0.49 −0.85 −0.17 0.20 24 −12.3*
Saudi Arabia −0.06 −0.14 −0.16 0.14 0.11 15 −2.2*
Senegal −0.19 −0.20 −0.41 0.01 0.10 42 −11.8*
Seychelles −0.16 −0.15 −0.44 0.07 0.14 31 −6.4*
Sierra Leone −0.47 −0.50 −0.84 −0.17 0.20 41 −15.1*
Singapore −0.07 −0.05 −0.39 0.19 0.13 40 −3.2*
Slovak Republic −0.40 −0.42 −0.65 −0.14 0.16 16 −10.0*
Slovenia −0.16 −0.14 −0.56 0.11 0.18 16 −3.6*
Solomon Islands −0.35 −0.32 −0.81 −0.09 0.18 30 −10.9*
South Africa −0.56 −0.59 −0.95 −0.04 0.22 42 −16.3*
Continued on next page
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Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Spain −0.25 −0.31 −0.65 0.17 0.23 42 −7.2*
Sri Lanka −0.45 −0.44 −0.83 −0.08 0.17 42 −16.9*
St. Kitts & Nevis −0.16 −0.17 −0.38 −0.05 0.10 24 −8.2*
St. Lucia −0.11 −0.10 −0.24 0.01 0.07 29 −8.1*
St.Vincent & Grenadines −0.16 −0.20 −0.38 −0.05 0.10 29 −9.2*
Sudan −0.26 −0.29 −0.29 −0.22 0.04 7 −18.4*
Suriname −0.37 −0.29 −0.95 −0.03 0.26 21 −6.5*
Swaziland −0.29 −0.30 −0.84 0.06 0.18 38 −9.7*
Sweden −0.26 −0.26 −0.43 0.02 0.11 42 −15.4*
Switzerland −0.14 −0.15 −0.24 −0 0.07 16 −7.4*
Syrian Arab Republic −0.28 −0.30 −0.31 −0.23 0.04 3 −11.5*
Tajikistan −0.54 −0.57 −0.83 −0.28 0.19 14 −10.6*
Tanzania −0.53 −0.56 −0.77 −0.20 0.16 37 −20.3*
Thailand −0.42 −0.40 −0.71 −0.19 0.17 35 −14.2*
Togo −0.26 −0.24 −0.53 0.01 0.12 42 −13.9*
Tonga −0.47 −0.45 −0.72 −0.27 0.12 23 −19.6*
Trinidad and Tobago −0.01 −0 −0.45 0.41 0.20 42 −0.2*
Tunisia −0.50 −0.50 −0.77 −0.20 0.12 42 −28.1*
Turkey −0.51 −0.53 −0.85 −0.12 0.18 42 −18.6*
Uganda −0.35 −0.34 −0.80 0.18 0.30 32 −6.7*
Ukraine −0.40 −0.43 −0.72 −0.05 0.22 16 −7.3*
United Kingdom −0.28 −0.26 −0.67 0.05 0.18 42 −10.2*
Uruguay −0.19 −0.19 −0.61 0.22 0.19 36 −5.8*
Vanuatu −0.03 −0.01 −0.22 0.13 0.09 16 −1.2*
Venezuela −0.15 −0.14 −0.64 0.24 0.25 42 −4.0*
Vietnam −0.23 −0.24 −0.49 0.01 0.15 14 −5.7*
Yemen, Rep. 0.02 0.06 −0.35 0.24 0.18 15 0.5*
Zambia −0.38 −0.25 −0.82 0.07 0.27 42 −9.1*
Continued on next page
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Country Mean Median Min Max SD N t-stat
Zimbabwe −0.61 −0.69 −0.83 −0.09 0.22 24 −13.6*
Notes: H0 : Mean = 0, H1 : Mean > 0. A “*” indicates that we cannot reject H0
at the 5% level.
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